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Abstract: This paper attempts to examine the relationship of equity ownership and financial performance of 
firms in India. The study explored the possibility that whether equity ownership type affects the financial 
performance of listed Indian firms. The study examined the relationship of equity ownership with accounting 
as well as market measures of financial performance of the firms. The study sampled the 500 listed 
companies constituting BSE 500 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India. The 397 most actively listed 
companies on BSE 500 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were 
chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of 2009-10. The study used Ordinary least square (OLS) 
to examine the relationship between the equity ownership and financial performance of the Indian listed 
firms. The findings of the study depict the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian 
market. The results of the regression analyses interestingly indicate that the dispersed equity ownership  
influences certain dimensions of accounting financial performance measures (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not 
market performance measures (i.e. Tobin’s Q, P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other 
factors (Behavioral, macro economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership 
structure. The findings of the study might be relevant for practitioners and investors for taking their financing 
and investment decisions.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Capital structure, equity ownership structure and its impact on financial performance of firms has always 
been a serious agenda for researches across the globe. Scholars across the world are putting efforts to 
understand the impact of capital structure and equity ownership on financial performance of the firms. What 
is the composition of debt and equity in capital structure of the firm and who owns the firm’s equity and how 
does that affect financial performance of a firm has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades? The 
modern organization emphasizes the separation of management and ownership; in practice, the interests of 
group managing the company can vary from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. The 
review of literature has suggests that an immense attention to the ownership structure and financial 
performance of the firms. One of the biggest conflicts in any public limited company is not only between 
management and the shareholders but also between the controlling interest shareholders and non controlling 
interest shareholders. The share holders having controlling interest in a public limited company is able to 
influence the decisions of top management but the same luxury is not available with the smaller shareholders 
having non controlling interest in the company. This distribution of shareholders between shareholders 
having controlling and noncontrolling interest varies from company to company. In other words the equity 
ownership structure varies from company to company and that so the performance of the company varies 
from company to company depending upon the ownership distribution. 
   
 The available literature suggests that the majority of studies in this area focused on the issue corporate 
governance but only in some of the recent studies the scholars started focusing on the issue of ownership 
structure and firm performance.  In Indian context very few studies focused on this aspect. This paper is a 
moderate attempt to examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature review, where both theoretical and 
empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corporate governance 
mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and 
discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for 
decades; however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to 
document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the 
agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareholders is the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems 
continue to be sources of large costs to shareholders. Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal 
corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market competition would derive firms toward 
that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression 
of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck et al. (1988) by taking 
percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the company as a measure of ownership concentration 
and holding both Tobin’s Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and 
using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and board ownership ranging 
from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board ownership ranging from 5% to 25%, and again a positive 
relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a 
corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The interests of other investors can generally be protected through contractual 
arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual 
claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Loderer and Martin (1997) analyzed the shareholding of insiders (i.e., director’s ownership) as a measure of 
ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobin’s Q as performance measure, they 
found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, but 
performance is a negative predictor of ownership. Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) examined the impact of 
ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. 
According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to financial institutions is stronger 
in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance 
affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Lehmann 
and Weigand (2000) found that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance 
profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentration seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many 
of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect 
profitability significantly negatively. Their empirical evidence suggests that representation of owners on the 
board of executive directors does not make a difference. Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) in their study of 637 
Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) examined the relation between the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobin’s Q for 
five years—1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an 
endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression 
model, they found no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance.  
 
In an interesting study by Lins (2000) investigated the relationship between management ownership 
structure, block share holders and the value of firm. He found that non management block shareholding is 
positively related with the value of any firm. In another study Lemmon and Lins (2003) studied the 
relationship between ownership structure and value of the firms in financial crisis. They found that the 
variables are negatively related. They found that ownership structure is an important determinant in the 
financial performance of any firm. Lauterbach and Tolkowsky (2004) attempted to study the relationship 
between controlling group shareholders and Tobin’s Q and they revealed that the value of Tobin’s Q 
maximizes if controlling interest goes above 67%. Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2005) addressed the issue 
relationship of insider ownership and corporate performance and they revealed that there is positive and 
significant relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 
(2007) tried the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found 
that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure. He also provides evidence that large 
non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected agency 
problem.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
The study aims to explore the effect of ownership structure on performance of a firm. It investigates whether 
the ownership type affects some key accounting measures ROE and ROA and market performance indicators 
Tobin’s Q, P/E and P/B of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the 
performance of the listed companies of BSE 500, other than ownership structure. The data set consists of 
detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 397 most actively traded BSE 500 listed 
companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange of India (BSE) during 2009-2010. The 397 companies cover a 
broad spectrum of sectors or industries totaling 18, which are: Finance, Oil & Gas, Information Technology, 
Metal, Metal Products & Mining, Capital Goods, FMCG, Transport Equipments, Power, Housing Related, 
Healthcare, Telecom, Diversified, Chemical & Petrochemical, Miscellaneous, Media & Publishing, Transport 
Services, Tourism, and Agriculture.  
 
The main financial indicators obtained from the companies financial statements included Total Revenues or 
Turnover, Gross Profit, Net Income or Earnings After Taxes, Current Assets, Fixed Assets, Long Term Debt and 
Shareholders Equity. Finally, the third subset consists of companies’ stock performance indicators obtained 
from CMIE PROWESS database including value traded, volume traded, number of transactions, market 
capitalization, market price as well as some calculated ratios using both CMIE PROWESS database as well as 
items reported in financial statements of sample companies such as debt to equity ratio, return on equity, 
return on assets, price earnings ratio and price to book value. The empirical investigation is conducted using 
known Ordinary Least Square Estimation methodology using both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on 
Asset (ROA) variables - representing accounting performance measures, and Tobin’s Q. Price-Earning Ratio 
(P/E) and Price to Book Value (P/BV) – representing stock market performance measures; separately as 
dependent variables. The following formula was used for modeling: 
  
Yij = α + xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + xnpi,j + xnpni,j + ε  ……………………(i) 
 
Where ε ~ ND (0, σ2) 
 
Yij    : i corresponds to ROE, ROI, Q, P/E or P/B for company j (j=1…397) 
xff, j : represents the percentage of free float in company j capital structure, 
xde,j : represents the debt to equity ratio for company j, 
xdph,j and xfp,j : represents the domestic promoter and foreign promoter holding in the company 
xnpi,j and xnpni,j : represents non promoter institutional and non promoter non institutional holding of the 
company.  
 
The independent variables are represented by the percentage of Free Floated shares (FF), Debt to Equity 
ratio (D/E) and four variables representing promoters and non promoters’ stake representing the ownership 
structure in sampled companies.  
 
4. Analysis and Results  
 
Inspection of ownership data reveals that the concentration of equity ownership in sampled 98 listed Indian 
firms of Bombay stock exchange of India Two measures of the structure of corporate ownership are used: the 
fraction of shares owned by a firm’s promoters, (Indian and Foreign promoters’ holding) and the fraction of 
shares owned by a non promoters (including all institutional and non institutional promoters). Table 1(a) and 
1(b) lists the frequency distribution of these measures of corporate ownership. The results suggests that 
promoter’s holding ranges from 0 per cent to 99.33 per cent around a mean of 51.62.0 per cent; non promoter 
share holding ranges from 0.67 per cent to 100 per cent around a mean of 47.25 per cent.  
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Table 1(a): Frequency Distribution Measure of Ownership Structure 
  Promoters Holdings Non Promoters Holdings 
Range  Frequency Percentage Cumulative Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
0-10% 10 2.48% 2.48% 5 1.24% 1.24% 
10-20% 5 1.24% 3.71% 20 4.95% 6.19% 
20-30% 33 8.17% 11.88% 49 12.13% 18.32% 
30-40% 57 14.11% 25.99% 63 15.59% 33.91% 
40-50% 80 19.80% 45.79% 85 21.04% 54.95% 
50-60% 83 20.54% 66.34% 87 21.53% 76.49% 
60-70% 63 15.59% 81.93% 55 13.61% 90.10% 
70-80% 47 11.63% 93.56% 27 6.68% 96.78% 
80-90% 19 4.70% 98.27% 5 1.24% 98.02% 
90-100% 7 1.73% 100.00% 8 1.98% 100.00% 
 
Table 1(b): Summary Statistics (%) 
  Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
PROMOTERS_HOLDING____ 51.62 99.33 0.00 18.90 404 
NON_PROMOTERS_HOLDING___ 47.25 100.00 0.67 18.33 404 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the sampled data. The distributions of these two variables are 
skewed. The coefficient of skewness for ownership structure is positive, implying that the distribution has a 
long right tail. To obtain a symmetric distribution, the raw data are converted to log values using the logistic 
transformation, i.e. log [percentage ownership/(100-percentage ownership)].  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Q RONW ROCE P_E P_B FF PH NPH 
 Mean 2.84 14.93 10.65 31.65 3.84 0.47 51.55 47.30 
 Median 1.63 16.68 9.27 19.69 2.54 0.50 51.12 48.50 
 Maximum 81.48 155.55 152.94 3535.28 101.80 1.00 99.33 100.00 
 Minimum -8.51 -363.53 -322.32 -3212.36 -40.15 0.05 0.00 0.67 
 Std. Dev. 5.29 27.22 23.21 282.07 7.51 0.18 19.02 18.45 
 Skewness 10.06 -6.72 -6.79 2.46 7.83 0.15 -0.17 0.14 
 Kurtosis 134.06 98.82 112.44 118.75 101.11 2.78 3.04 3.13 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.39 0.43 
 Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 
 
Table 3 gives the correlation matrix of the sampled data. In our sample, the correlation between the two 
measures of ownership concentration is -0.96. This negative value indicates that many of the important 
shareholders are not defined as management shareholders since they have representation on corporate 
boards. The results suggest that accounting measures of firm’s performance are significantly correlated with 
free float, non promoters’ and promoters’ holding of the sampled Indian firms. However the capital structure 
of the firms is not significantly correlated with any performance measure of the Indian firms. The markets 
measures of the firm performance P/E and P/B are also not significantly related with the ownership structure 
of the Indian firms.  
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
 Tobin's Q ROE ROA P/E P/B FF PH NPH D/E 
Tobin's Q 1.00 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.36 -0.16 0.18 -0.18 -0.02 
p . 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 
ROE 0.22 1.00 0.33 -0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.24 
p 0.00 . 0.00 0.36 0.02 0.90 0.75 0.79 0.00 
ROA 0.20 0.33 1.00 -0.02 0.31 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 
p 0.00 0.00 . 0.70 0.00 0.33 0.28 0.59 0.16 
P/E 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 
p 0.01 0.06 0.96 0.01 0.06 0.96 0.01 0.06 0.96 
P/B 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.38 1.00 -0.15 0.17 -0.16 -0.09 
p 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
FF -0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.15 1.00 -0.87 0.87 -0.04 
P 0.00 0.90 0.33 0.94 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.37 
PH 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.17 -0.87 1.00 -0.96 0.06 
p 0.00 0.75 0.28 0.66 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.25 
NPH -0.18 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.16 0.87 -0.96 1.00 -0.06 
p 0.00 0.79 0.59 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.25 
D/E -0.02 -0.24 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 1.00 
p 0.73 0.00 0.16 0.98 0.07 0.37 0.25 0.25 . 
 
Tables 4a and 4b show the analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the variables. With F- values of 3.36 (sig 0.01), 
6.48 (sig 0.00) and 2.80 (sig 0.03) for dependent variable Q, ROE and ROA and 3.97 (sig 0.00) for P/E and P/B 
as performance proxies respectively, it clearly shows that there is a strong relationship between all the 
performance measures with ownership structure of the company. The findings of the study clearly depicts 
that all accounting as well as market measures of the performance are significantly related with ownership 
structure of the Indian firms. 
 
Table 4 (a): ANOVA Table (Q, ROE and ROA as Dependent Variable)  
Tobin’s Q as Dependent Variable ROE as Dependent Variable ROA as Dependent Variable 
F Value Significance F Value Significance F Value Significance 
3.36 0.01 6.48 0.00 2.80 0.13 
 
Table 4 (b): ANOVA Table (P/E and P/B as Dependent Variables) 
P/E  as Dependent Variable P/B as Dependent Variable 
F Value Significance F Value Significance 
0.14 0.97 3.97 0.00 
 
Table 5(a) and 5(b) show the results of the coefficient estimates. The coefficient of free float and promotors 
holding has positive relation with all the performance measures used in the study. But non promoters’ 
holding and debt equity ratio has negative coefficient for Q and ROE this indicates a negative relationship 
between these variables with Q and ROE. The findings clearly depict that all accounting measures of 
performance ROE and ROA of sampled firm are significantly related with ownership structure of the form 
while the market measures of firm’s performance are not significantly related with the ownership structure 
of the firm. The findings of the study clearly indicate that as the Indian firms are more dominated by 
promoters’ shareholder group and family owned business, the focus is more on the fundamentals of the firm 
rather than the market measures.    
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Table 5 (a): Coefficient estimates ((Q, ROE and ROA as Dependent Variable) 
Independent 
Variable 
Tobin’s Q ROE ROA 
Beta t p Beta t p Beta t p 
FF 0.01 0.05 0.96 0.09 0.88 0.08 -0.05 -0.48 0.03 
PH 0.12 0.64 0.52 0.09 0.49 0.02 0.37 1.94 0.05 
NPH -0.07 -0.34 0.73 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.37 1.94 0.05 
D/E -0.03 -0.56 0.57 -0.25 -5.01 0.00 -0.07 -1.47 0.14 
 
Table 5 (b): Coefficient estimates ((P/E and P/B) 
Independent Variable 
P/E P/B 
Beta t p Beta t p 
FF 0.06 0.59 0.55 0.01 0.06 0.96 
PH 0.08 0.41 0.68 0.17 0.91 0.36 
NPH 0.01 0.03 0.98 -0.01 -0.03 0.98 
D/E 0.00 -0.06 0.95 -0.10 -2.07 0.04 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The significance of ownership characteristics and accounting performance measures i.e. ROA and ROE could 
be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, measured by, its financial indicators 
such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important factors used by investors in India to assess company’s 
performance. In India, although earlier investors have culturally placed more emphasis on accounting 
performance measures, not stock market indicators, due to the fact that the Indian firms are largely closely 
held family owned business houses. Furthermore, these promoters groups always favored payment of 
dividends rather than stock price appreciation, due to more focus on fundamental factors rather than 
speculative market related factors. For that reason, the dividends yields paid by Indian companies are always 
very high compared to other emerging and developed markets. Thus the study did not consider dividend 
yield in the stock market indicators since it will be a distorted measure since issuers in India always pay a 
high dividends yield, sometimes, irrespective of earnings, since they are valued by investors according to 
dividends not price appreciation.  
 
Furthermore, the type of ownership had an insignificant impact on stock market performance measures, 
which might imply that the stock performance was mainly affected by either economic and market conditions 
or speculative factors rather than ownership concentration. In addition, the results of this study could also be 
related to the market inefficiency of the Indian stock market and improper stock market valuation. The study 
concludes that certain time due to large foreign institutional investments and high liquidity the stock market 
performance measures may not be reliable. Therefore the accounting measures of performance of firms can 
directly be related with ownership structure of the firm than market measures.  The study finally concludes 
that there is a significant relationship of accounting performance of the Indian firms with ownership 
structure of firms but market measures of the firm are not significantly with ownership structure of the 
Indian firms.  
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